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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
ROBERT W. STRINGHAM, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 960426-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals his convictions for communications fraud, theft, and a pattern 
of unlawful activity. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-
3(2)(e) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Since defendant has failed to meet his burden of marshaling the 
evidence, should this Court decline to consider his insufficiency claim? If the 
merits are considered, was the evidence sufficient to convict defendant of 
communications fraud, theft, and a pattern of unlawful activity? "When 
challenging a jury verdict, a defendant must marshal all the evidence supporting that 
verdict and then demonstrate why that evidence is insufficient to support the 
conviction." State v. Farrow. 919 P.2d 50, 53 n.l (Utah App. 1996) (citing State v. 
Moore. 802 P.2d 732, 739 (Utah App. 1990)). When a defendant fails to meet this 
marshaling burden, this Court will decline to consider an insufficiency claim. LL 
When a jury verdict is challenged on insufficiency grounds, this Court reviews 
the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it in 
the light most favorable to the verdict of the jury. [This Court will] 
reverse a jury conviction for insufficient evidence only when the 
evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable 
that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted. 
State v. Hamilton. 827 P.2d 232, 235 (Utah 1992) (citations omitted); gfig also. State v. 
BuiL 839 P.2d 880 (Utah App.), cert.denied. 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993). 
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it permitted the testimony of 
an Internal Revenue Service agent that assigning income is unlawful? The 
appropriate standard of review for questions of admissibility of evidence is abuse of 
discretion. State v. Garcia. 912 P.2d 997 (Utah App.) (citing State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 
932, 938 (Utah 1994)), cert.denied. 919 P.2d 1208 (Utah 1996). In addition, "in 
reviewing a trial court's decision to admit evidence, [this Court] will not reverse that 
ruling unless a substantial right of the party has been affected." Id* (citing State v. 
Qiiyei, 820 P.2d 474, 479 (Utah App. 1991) (citations omitted), cert, denied. 843 P.2d 
516 (Utah 1992)). 
3. Did the trial court instruct the jury as to the criminal intent required for 
communications fraud? Were the trial court's instructions sufficient? "[This 
Court] may review jury instructions or the lack thereof for error in the absence of an 
2 
objection only 'to avoid a manifest injustice.' Utah R. Crim. P. 19(c)." State v. 
Powell. 872 P.2d 1027 (Utah 1994) (citing State v. Verde. 770 P.2d 116, 121-22 (Utah 
1989)). "Manifest injustice" is reviewed under the same standard used for deteraiining 
plain error under Utah Rule of Evidence 103(d). Verde. 770 P.2d at 121-122. "That 
standard is two-pronged. First, the error must be 'obvious.' Second, the error must be 
of sufficient magnitude that it affects the substantial rights of a party." LL; £££ alsg 
State v. Irwin. 924 P.2d 5 (Utah App. 1996). 
"[The Court] reviewfs] jury instructions in their entirety to determine whether 
the instructions, taken as a whole, fairly instruct the jury on the applicable law." Law 
v. Blanding Citv. 893 P.2d 1083, 1084 (Utah App.) (citing Ames v. Maas. 846 P.2d 
468, 471 (Utah App. 1993)), cert.denied. 910 P.2d 425 (Utah 1995). It will reverse a 
conviction "on the basis of an instruction improperly submitted to the jury only where 
the party challenging the propriety of the instruction 'demonstrates prejudice stemming 
from the instructions viewed in the aggregate.'" LL (quoting State v. Haston. 811 P.2d 
929, 931 (Utah App. 1991), rev'd on other grounds. 846 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1993)). 
4. Did trial defense counsel's failure to object to the trial court's 
instructions constitute deficient performance which prejudiced defendant? 
"[W]here the ineffective assistance claim is raised for the first time on direct 
appeal, [this Court] must decide whether defendant was deprived of the effective 
assistance of counsel as a matter of law. State v. Ellifritz. 835 P.2d 170, 175 (Utah 
3 
App. 1992)." State v. Tennyson. 850P.2d461 (Utah App. 1993). tt[A]ppellate 
review of counsel's performance must be highly deferential; otherwise the 'distorting 
effects of hindsight' would produce too great a temptation for courts to second-guess 
trial counsel's performance on the basis of an inanimate record." LL (citing Strickland 
v. Washington. 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2065 (1984)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. §76-10-1801(1) and (7)(1990): 
(1) Any person who has devised any scheme or artifice to defraud 
another or to obtain from another money, property, or anything of value 
by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or 
material omissions, and who communicates directly or indirectly with any 
person by any means for the purpose of executing or concealing the 
scheme or artifice is guilty of [communications fraud]. . . . 
(7) A person may not be convicted under this section unless the 
pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions made or 
omitted were made or omitted intentionally, knowingly, or with a reckless 
disregard for the truth. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-404 (1973): 
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized 
control over the property of another with a purpose to deprive him 
thereof. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-10-1602(2), (4)(k), and (4)(ppp)(1994): 
(2) "Pattern of unlawful activity" means engaging in conduct which 
constitutes the commission of at least three episodes of unlawful activity, 
which episodes are not isolated, but have the same or similar purposes, 
results, participants, victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are 
interrelated by distinguishing characteristics. Taken together, the 
episodes shall demonstrate continuing unlawful conduct and be related 
either to each other . . . . 
(4) "Unlawful activity" means to directly engage in conduct or to 
solicit, request, command, encourage, or intentionally aid another person 
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to engage in conduct which would constitute any offense described by the 
following crimes or categories of crimes . . . : 
(k) theft, Section 76-6-404; . . . 
(ppp) communications fraud, Section 76-10-1801;.. . . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged in an amended information with three counts of 
communications fraud, second degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-10-
1801 (1990), twelve counts of theft, six of which were second degree felonies, five 
third degree felonies, and one a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§§76-6-404 (1973) and 412 (1989), and one count of engaging in a pattern of unlawful 
activity, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§76-10-1602 (1994), 
(R. 47-49). 
Following a jury trial, defendant was found guilty on all counts (R. 347-62; 
384). Defendant's motion to arrest judgment (R. 456-66) was denied (R. 1144-1145). 
His motion to sentence to the next lower offense on each count (R. 400-409) was 
granted (R. 1152). The trial court sentenced defendant to concurrent terms not to 
exceed five years in the Utah State Prison on Counts I-IV, a concurrent term of six 
months in the Utah County Jail on Count V, and concurrent terms of one year in the 
Utah County Jail on Counts VI-XVI (R. 1173-1175). The jail sentences were stayed, 
and defendant was placed on probation for 36 months (R. 1175). In addition, defendant 
was ordered to serve 45 days in the Utah County Jail and be given credit for "good 
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time," to pay a monthly supervision fee of $30.00 at the discretion of Adult Probation 
and Parole, to complete 500 hours of alternative community service witiiin 18 months, 
to pay a fine in the amount of $2,000 or complete 400 hours of alternative community 
service, and to pay a surcharge in the amount of $1,700 (R. 1178-1180). The trial 
court reserved a hearing on restitution contingent on whether a companion civil case 
was pursued within 24 months from the date of sentencing (R. 1179).' Defendant 
timely appealed (R. 477-78; Utah R. App. P. 4(a)). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Summary 
Communications Fraud (Counts II-IV>. Over a three-year period, defendant 
under-reported his income to his pension fund in order to obtain an annual low-income 
pension supplement of $4,800.00. Defendant had assigned the additional income to his 
wife by having checks compensating him made payable to her sole proprietorship. 
Theft (Counts V-XVD. During the 12 monthly pay periods beginning 
immediately after he was given responsibility for bookkeeping and payroll, defendant 
stole money from the company that employed his wife and himself. Although his 
monthly salary was to compensate him for all his services, defendant assigned some of 
the hours he worked to his wife, computed them at his wife's hourly rate, and included 
1
 Through his newly-retained counsel, defendant advised that he did not intend 
to pursue the civil case while his criminal appeal was pending (R. 1166-1169). 
6 
the amounts in checks he prepared made payable to her sole proprietorship. In 
addition, after a "trial balloon" of $87.50 the first month, defendant simply included 
additional amounts (varying between $800.00 and $1,375.00 each month) in padded 
payments to his wife's sole proprietorship for work neither he nor she ever performed. 
Pattern of unlawful activity (Count D. These crimes (communications fraud and 
theft) constituted a pattern of unlawful activity. 
Record Facts 
The evidence and all reasonable inferences are recited in a light most favorable 
to the verdict. State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1205 (Utah 1993) (case cites omitted). 
A. Background: "GS Consulting." Defendant and his wife both had training 
and experience as drug and alcohol abuse counselors (R. 402-405, 1216). After they 
married, they opened a joint checking account under the name "GS Consulting" (R. 
1200; 1216). The initials "GS" stood for "Gail Stringham," the name of defendant's 
wife (R. 1215). "GS Consulting" was never registered in the State as a sole 
proprietorship or as any other business entity (R. 1200). According to her own 
testimony, defendant's wife was "GS Consulting" (R. 1218, 1231), and it had no other 
employees (R. 1233-1234; SS£ also. R. 1210). Indeed, for income tax purposes, "GS 
Consulting" used her social security number (R. 1232; sfi£ also. R. 1221). 
B. Association between UGS Consulting" and Assessment and Psychotherapy 
Associates f APA .^ In May 1989, APA employed defendant and his wife to open a 
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satellite office in Utah County (R. 858-860, 1191-1192, 1217). APA hired defendant 
as a part-time employee to manage the office and to provide limited counseling services 
for which he was to be paid a total salary of $400.00 a month (R. 860, 876, 877, 892, 
1070, 1100, 1192, 1218). APA hired defendant's wife to provide clinical counseling 
services for which she was to be paid $25.00 an hour (R. 893, 1218-1220; State's 
Exhibit 5). Both defendant and his wife received paychecks in their own names from 
APA (sfi£, e.g., R. 877, 1219; Defendant's Exhibit 11). In addition, although APA 
never contracted directly with "GS Consulting" for any services, APA also made 
monthly and other supplementary payments to defendant by check made payable to "GS 
Consulting" at defendant's request (R. 1236; s££ alsQ R. 1232-1233). 
C. Communications fraud: United States Steel and Carnegie Pension Fund fthe 
pension fundi Defendant received a regular pension as a former employee of United 
States Steel (R. 1073). If he earned less than $5,500 a year, defendant could also 
qualify for an annual pension supplement up to $4,800 (R. 1074). If he earned more 
than $5,500 a year, defendant could still qualify for a supplement that would be less 
than $4,800. M- To qualify for a supplement, the pension fund required defendant to 
submit a report each year recording his actual income for the past year, with a copy of 
his W-2 or other proof of earnings, and an estimate of his income for the upcoming 
year (R. 1075; State's Exhibits 13-15). Defendant omitted a total of $47,225.75 in 
annual reports of his income to the pension fund over three years (R. 1081). As a 
8 
result, he received a total of $13,475.00 in low income pension supplements to which 
he was not entitled. Id. 
1. Count IT: 1990. Because his APA salary was $400.00 a month, defendant's 
W-2 reflected that his annual income for 1990 was $4,800.00 (State's Exhibit 13; sfi£ 
also Defendant's Exhibit 11, check numbers 2121, 2171, 2196, 4042, 2245, 2262, 
4095, 2370, 2460, 2497, 2570, 2658).2 Defendant recorded this amount on the report 
of his actual income to the pension fund, and attached a copy of his W-2 (MJ. 
The report also required defendant to tt[w]rite in other earned income." In the 
blank provided, defendant put "0" (zero), and listed his "Total income" as 
"$4,800.00" (LL). 
Based on his representations to the pension fund, defendant qualified for the 
maximum low income pension supplement of $4,800.00, which the pension fund paid 
to defendant for 1990 (1074-1075, 1079; State's Exhibit 13). 
However, because APA made additional payments to defendant through "GS 
Consulting," defendant's W-2 and his report of income to his pension fund did not 
reflect all of his actual 1990 income. By agreement, APA had also paid defendant 
$600.00 a month for eight months, and $800.00 for four months as draws against future 
revenues defendant was projected to bring to APA through his marketing efforts (R. 
2
 Aside from the first check, all the checks are for less than $400.00 because of 
income tax withholding (R. 1042; see argument under Point I.A.2.(c), below). 
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877-878; SS£ R. 1220; Defendant's Exhibit 11, check numbers 2122, 2172, 2180, 
4046, 2268, 2301, 2474, 2501, 2582, 2670). These amounts were paid to "GS 
Consulting" at defendant's request, although they were to compensate defendant (R. 
877-879). Defendant did not include this amount (a total of $8,000.00, or nearly 
double his reported income) in the report of his actual income to the pension fund 
(State's Exhibit 13). 
In May 1990, APA also paid defendant $912.75 by separate check for additional 
money "he felt was owing that month" (R. 879; see Defendant's Exhibit 11, check 
number 128). (Defendant contacted the company's controller out of the office to 
arrange a meeting so he could be paid this amount. LL) Even though the check was 
made payable to defendant, he likewise failed to include this amount in his 1990 report 
to the pension fund (State's Exhibit 13; ssSi Defendant's Exhibit 11, check number 
128). 
In sum, defendant's actual income for 1990 was $13,712.75 (State's Exhibit 1, 
addendum A), or nearly $9,000.00 more than he reported to me pension fund; in other 
words, defendant's actual income was nearly triple the amount he reported. If 
defendant had reported the entire amount, the pension fund would have paid him a 
$925.00 supplement instead of the $4,800.00 he received (R. 1079). 
2. Count m: 1991. Because defendant reported to the pension fund that his 
actual annual income for 1991 was $4,800.00, he qualified for the maximum low 
10 
income pension supplement of $4,800.00 which the pension fund paid to him for 1991 
(1074-1075, 1080; State's Exhibit 14).3 Although APA had paid defendant a salary of 
$400.00 a month during 1991 (see. Defendant's Exhibit 11, check numbers 2806, 2865, 
2934, 3045, 3096, 3180, 3291, 3357, 3401, 3520, 3569, 3644)/ defendant's report to 
the pension fund again omitted the majority of his actual income. 
APA had also paid defendant $800.00 for one month, and $900.00 a month for 
six more months of 1991, as draws against future revenues (R. 882; State's Exhibit 2, 
addendum B; S£g Defense Exhibit 11, check numbers 2670, 2817, 2878, 2948, 3059, 
3112, 3197, 3307). These amounts were paid to "GS Consulting" at defendant's 
request. LL Defendant did not include this amount ($6,200.00) in the report of his 
actual 1991 income to the pension fund (State's Exhibit 14). 
In August 1991, APA also paid defendant $5,000.00 as settlement for services 
defendant said he had provided, made payable to "GS Consulting" at defendant's 
request (R. 883-886, 985-988; 1048-1049; Sfi£ Defense Exhibit 11, check number 
3317). Defendant likewise failed to include this amount in the report of his actual 
annual income to the pension fund (State's Exhibit 14). 
Beginning in August 1991, defendant assumed additional bookkeeping services 
3
 Defendant's 1991 W-2 is the last page of State's Exhibit 15. 
4
 Each check is for less than $400.00 because of income tax withholding (R. 
1042; see argument under Point I.A.2.(c), below). 
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and was put in charge of payroll for which he was paid a $700.00 a month salary made 
payable to ttGS Consulting" at his request (R. 885-888; 1100-1101; 1048-1049; 1070). 
(In the summer of 1991, defendant told a prospective APA employee that he made 
$400.00 a month from APA, but -needed $1,100" and that he put the additional 
$700.00 "in GS Consulting" (R. 1070)). Defendant also failed to include this amount 
($3,500.00) in the report of his actual annual income to the pension fund (State's 
Exhibit 14). 
Finally, defendant received an additional $5,100.00 from APA during this period 
which he failed to report to the pension fund (sss E.I. Theft- Counts V-IX: APA 
payroll. August - December 1991 below: see also R. 1100-1101). 
In sum, defendant's actual income for 1991 was $24,600.00 (sjgfi State's Exhibit 
2),5 or nearly $20,000.00 more than he reported to the pension fund. In other words, 
defendant's actual income was nearly five times the amount he reported. If defendant 
had reported the entire amount, he would not have been eligible for a low income 
pension supplement (R. 1080). However, based on the information defendant 
provided, the pension fund paid him $4,800.00 for 1991 (R. 1079). 
5
 The total on State's Exhibit 2 is $1.50 more than the total from the figures on 
State's Exhibit 3. There is a $1.00 discrepancy between the totals from State's Exhibit 
3 for September and November 1991 and the totals for those months on State's Exhibit 
2; and there is a $.50 discrepancy between the total from State's Exhibit 3 for October 
1991 and the total for that month on State's Exhibit 2 (State's Exhibits 2 and 3). 
12 
3. Count IV: 1992. The day after APA's controller announced that he was 
going to relieve defendant of the responsibility for preparing payroll (namely, on 
August 4, 1992), defendant and his wife resigned from APA (R. 914). Because of his 
resignation, defendant received his $400.00 APA salary paycheck only through July 
1992, and he reported to the pension fund that his annual income for 1992 was $3,200 
(State's Exhibit 15; see Defense Exhibit 11, check numbers 3729, 3826, 3900, 3991, 
3551, 3606, 3701).6 Based on this reported income, defendant qualified for the 
maximum low income pension supplement of $4,800 which the pension fund paid 
defendant for 1992 (1074-1075, 1080; State's Exhibit 15). 
Again, because APA made additional payments to defendant through "GS 
Consulting," his report to the pension fund did not reflect all of his actual income. 
APA had also continued to pay defendant $700 a month for bookkeeping and payroll 
services. These amounts were paid to "GS Consulting" at defendant's request (R. 890-
96; 1048-1049; 1070). Defendant did not include this amount (a total of $4,900.00 -
or, more than his reported income) in the report of his actual income to the pension 
fund (State's Exhibit 15). 
6
 This was an error, since defendant was only paid by APA through July. The 
actual amount of defendant's APA salary, paid by check in his name, should have been 
$2,800 (State's Exhibit 5). 
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Defendant received an additional $9,813.00 from APA during this period which 
he failed to report to the pension fund (see E.2. Theft - Counts X-XVT: APA payroll. 
January - July 1992 below: see also R. 1100-1101). 
Defendant's actual income for 1992 was $17,513.00 (State's Exhibit 5, 
addendum C),7 or $14,513.00 more than he reported to the pension fund. Indeed, 
defendant's actual income was more than five times the amount he reported. If 
defendant had reported the entire amount, he would not have been eligible for a low 
income pension supplement (R. 1080). However, based on information defendant 
provided, the pension fund paid him $4,800.00 (R. 1080). 
D. Theft. After turning over bookkeeping and payroll responsibilities to 
defendant in August 1991, the controller would typically sign blank checks for 
defendant to fill in later, or simply sign the checks prepared by defendant because he 
trusted him (R. 910-913; 1022; 1195-1196; 1235). The controller first became aware 
that something was wrong in August 1992 when he took back payroll and check-writing 
responsibilities from defendant (R. 913). After computing the July payroll, the 
controller noticed that the amount of money payable to defendant and "GS Consulting" 
was substantially less than what APA had routinely paid during the previous months (R. 
914). (In an October 1993 taped interview with a sheriffs office investigator, 
7
 This total excludes the $400.00 defendant actually over-reported to the pension 
fund for 1992. See n.6, above. 
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defendant initially stated that he had a $400.00 salary from APA, but he later indicated 
that, as his responsibilities increased, so did his income, and that he was eventually 
bringing in about $2,000.00 a month from APA (R. 1100-1101)). A review of billing 
sheets and pay documents disclosed why payments to defendant and "GS Consulting" 
had been so much higher over the previous months.8 
1. Counts V-IX: APA payroll. August - December 1991 
a. Double charging. Defendant and APA had agreed that his monthly salary of 
$1,100.00 would compensate him for all counseling services he rendered. However, 
after assuming control of payroll and bookkeeping in August 1991, defendant began 
double-charging for his counseling hours by assigning them to his wife and billing APA 
at her hourly rate (R. 890-896; s££ R. 1232-1233).9 These double billings amounted to 
an additional $400.00 for August, $350.00 for September, $300.00 for October, 
$250.00 for November, and $125.00 for December 1991 (State's Exhibits 3 and 6, 
8
 When the controller discovered there might be a problem, APA hired an 
outside accounting firm to conduct an audit (R. 1213). Information from the audit was 
ultimately provided to police investigators. I$L 
9
 Such an assignment of income was not authorized by defendant's employment 
agreement with APA (R. 943; 1048-1049), and was likewise unlawful (R. 1066) and 
improper (R. 1210-1212). 
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addendum D).10 Payments for assigned hours totaled $1,425.00 for 1991 (see State's 
Exhibit 14; paragraph C.2. above). 
h. Padded payments. In addition, with control over payroll, defendant simply 
began adding varying amounts to monthly compensation checks from APA to aGS 
Consulting" for work that neither he nor his wife ever performed, including $87.50 for 
August, $800.00 for September, $925.00 for October, $900.00 for November, and 
$962.50 for December 1991 (State's Exhibits 3 and 6). These unaccountable amounts 
totaled $3,675.00 for 1991 (see State's Exhibit 14; paragraph C.2. above). Although 
the controller signed checks for these payments because he trusted defendant and 
assumed work had been done, none of these unaccountable payments was authorized by 
APA (R. 913, 942-944). 
2. Counts X-XVI: APA payroll. January - July 1992 
a. Double charging. Defendant continued improperly assigning his counseling 
hours to his wife and calculating an amount due based on her hourly rate (R. 890-896; 
see R. 1232-1233)." This amounted to an additional $150.00 for January, $75.00 for 
10
 The December 1991 column for "Assigned Hrs. & Cash" on State's Exhibit 6 
apparently contains an error, since 5 hours at his wife's hourly rate of $25.00 would be 
$125.00 (as properly noted in the "Assigned Hr. Payment" column for December 1991 
on State's Exhibit 3). 
" APA billed patients or their insurance companies for counseling services 
defendant provided (see., State's Exhibit 22, Billing & Payment Ledger entries dated 
6/9/92, 6/15/92, 6/23/92, and 6/30/92). But defendant actually crossed out his name 
and inserted his wife's name on ledgers used to calculate payroll (TJL; see R. 910-913, 
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February, $125.00 for March, $175.00 for April, $100.00 for May, $325.00 for June, 
and $150.00 for July 1992 (State's Exhibits 3 and 6). Payment for assigned hours 
totaled $1,100.00 for 1992 (see State's Exhibit 15; paragraph 2.D. above).12 
h. Padded payments. Defendant also continued adding varying amounts to 
checks from APA to UGS Consulting" for work that neither he nor his wife ever 
performed, including $1,125.50 for January, $1,150.00 for February, $1,350.00 for 
March, $1,287.50 for April, $1,375.00 for May, $1,300.00 for June, and $1,125.00 
for July 1992 (State's Exhibits 3 and 6). These unaccountable amounts totaled 
$8,713.00 for 1992 (see State's Exhibit 15; paragraph 2.D. above). Although the 
controller signed checks for these payments assuming work had been done, none of 
these unaccountable payments was authorized by APA (R. 913, 942-944). 
E. Pattern of unlawful activity: communications fraud and theft. 
The three episodes of communications fraud were interrelated and had the same 
purpose, result, participants, victims, and methods of commission. The twelve 




 Again, such an assignment of income was forbidden by defendant's 
employment agreement with APA (R. 943; 1048-1049), and was likewise unlawful (R. 
1066) and improper (R. 1210-1212). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Since defendant has failed to meet his burden of marshaling the 
evidence, this Court should decline to consider his insufficiency claim. Defendant 
excludes any reference to his own admissions about the amount of money he was 
actually paid by APA, misrepresents the state of documentation in support of the jury's 
verdict, and reargues the evidence most favorable to him, leaving it to this court to sort 
out what evidence actually supports the jury's verdict. Therefore, defendant has failed 
to meet his marshaling burden and this Court should decline to consider his 
insufficiency claim. 
Even if the merits are considered, the evidence was sufficient to convict 
defendant of communications fraud, theft, and a pattern of unlawful activity. 
Defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he had the required 
mens rea to steal from APA and to defraud the pension fund. Specifically, defendant 
essentially asks this Court to rely on his wife's testimony about the terms of his August 
12, 1991 agreement with APA in support of his "honest belief" defense, to the 
exclusion of the other testimony at his trial. 
The jury serves as the exclusive judge of both the credibility of witnesses and the 
weight to be given particular evidence. Absent unusual circumstances not present here, 
a reviewing court may not reassess credibility or reweigh the evidence, but must 
resolve conflicts in the evidence in favor of the jury verdict. By their verdict, the jury 
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obviously rejected the testimony upon which defendant wants this Court to rely. 
Therefore, even if the merits are considered, defendant has failed to establish that 
"reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt" about his intent to steal 
and intent to defraud. The jury's verdict is supported by substantial evidence. 
2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it permitted the 
testimony of an Internal Revenue Service agent that assigning income is unlawful; 
in any event, any error in admitting the testimony was harmless. Defendant argues 
that it was an abuse of discretion to permit the IRS agent's testimony that assigning 
income is unlawful, arguing that the testimony was a comment on defendant's guilt and 
was irrelevant. 
These assertions are not only inconsistent, but both are erroneous. The expert's 
testimony was not a comment on defendant's guilt, but it was relevant on the issue of 
defendant's intent. Even if improperly admitted, the testimony was harmless since 
defendant's own CPA testified it would be improper for defendant to assign income, 
and defendant's wife testified that defendant actually did assign income to "GS 
Consulting" (even though that was not permitted by his agreement). This evidence, 
elicited during presentation of defendant's case, made any error in admitting the IRS 
agent's opinion testimony harmless. 
3. The trial court did instruct the jury on the criminal intent required for 
communications fraud, and the instructions were sufficient. Defendant argues that 
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the trial court completely failed to instruct the jury on the mens rea required to convict 
defendant of communications fraud. Defendant's claim is erroneous. Indeed, the trial 
court included instructions on intent and knowledge proposed by defendant. The trial 
court's instructions on the mens rea required for a conviction under communications 
fraud were sufficient. 
4. Trial defense counsel's failure to object to the trial court's instructions 
did not constitute deficient performance which prejudiced defendant because the 
instructions were proper. Defendant argues that, if the instruction issue under Point 
3 was not preserved, it was deficient performance for his trial defense counsel not to 
raise it. Defendant's argument can be resolved in the issue of prejudice, since, if the 
trial court had failed to give an elements instruction, the issue would have been 
preserved. In any event, since the trial court properly gave the required instructions, 
trial defense counsel's failure to object was not deficient performance. 
ARGUMENT 
Point 1 
SINCE DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO MEET HIS BURDEN OF 
MARSHALING THE EVIDENCE, THIS COURT SHOULD 
DECLINE TO CONSIDER HIS INSUFFICIENCY CLAIM; 
EVEN IF THE MERITS ARE CONSIDERED, THE EVIDENCE 
WAS SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT DEFENDANT OF 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, THEFT, AND A PATTERN OF 
UNLAWFUL ACTIVITY 
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Defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions 
(Def. Br. at 15). "When challenging a jury verdict, a defendant must marshal all the 
evidence supporting that verdict and then demonstrate why that evidence is insufficient 
to support the conviction." State v. Farrow. 919 P.2d 50, 53 n.l (Utah App. 1996) 
(citing State v. Moore. 802 P.2d 732, 739 (Utah App. 1990)). When a defendant fails 
to meet this marshaling burden, this Court will decline to consider an insufficiency 
claim. LL Defendant has failed to meet this burden. 
A. Failure to marshal. In addition to excluding any reference to his own 
admissions about the amount of money he was actually paid by APA (cL Def. Br. at 7-
15; R. 1070, 1100-1101), defendant misrepresents the state of documentation in support 
of the jury's verdict, and "merely reargues the evidence most favorable to him, leaving 
it to this court to sort out what evidence actually supports the jury's verdict." fifig York 
v- Shulsen. 875 P.2d 590, 598 (Utah App.), cjrLdfinied, 883 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1994); 
S£s also. Alta Indus. Ltd. v. Hurst. 846 P.2d 1282, 1287 (Utah 1993) ("Although 
[appellant] cites some evidence that supports the court's findings, even a cursory 
review of the record reveals [appellant] frequently omits crucial and incriminating 
evidence and cites testimony . . . without reference to conflicting testimony. . . ."). 
Therefore, defendant has failed to meet his marshaling burden, and this Court should 
decline to consider his insufficiency claim. Farrow. 919 P.2d at 53 n.l. 
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1. Defendant excluded his admissions. Defendant excluded two admissions 
about the amount of money he was actually paid by APA. In his annual report to the 
pension fund of his actual income for 1991, defendant represented that his monthly 
income from APA was $400.00 (State's Exhibit 14). However, in the summer of 
1991, defendant told a prospective APA employee that he made $400.00 a month, but 
"needed $1,100" and that he had the additional $700.00 put into "GS Consulting" (R. 
1070). 
In an October 1993 taped interview with a sheriffs office investigator, defendant 
initially stated that he had a $400.00 salary from APA, but he later indicated that, as 
his responsibilities increased, so did his income, and that he was eventually bringing in 
about $2,000.00 a month from APA (R. 1100-1101).13 
Neither of these admissions is included anywhere in defendant's brief, although 
both support the jury's verdict and severely undermine defendant's professed "honest 
belief" defense. Since he excluded them, defendant has failed to meet his marshaling 
burden, and this Court should decline to consider his insufficiency claim. Farrow. 919 
P.2dat53n.l. 
13
 Defendant's estimate was fairly accurate. His actual annual income was 
$13,712.75 in 1990, $24,600.00 (see n.5, above) in 1991, and $17,513.00 for the first 
seven months in 1992 (State's Exhibits 1-2 and 5), or about $2,000.00 a month for the 
last 18 months he was employed by APA. 
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2. Misrepresentations. In addition to excluding his admissions, defendant 
misrepresents the record on at least three significant points related to the existence or 
non-existence of documentation in support of the jury's verdict. 
(a.) "Agreements never reduced to writing*. First, in support of his "mass 
confusion" argument, defendant asserts that "none of the agreements between the 
parties were ever reduced to writing" (Def. Br. at 10; sfi£ also R. 21-22). On the 
contrary, the critical August 12, 1991 agreement was reduced to writing; the APA 
controller and the administrative assistant who typed the memorandum of the agreement 
both testified as to its terms (R. 946, 974, 1021-1022, 1047). The memorandum was 
never offered because APA's printed copy, and the floppy disk on which the 
memorandum was electronically stored, were stolen with some other business records 
during a burglary of APA offices the month after defendant and his wife resigned. Id. 
(b.) "No records to back up figures in State's Exhibit 3". Second, defendant 
asserts that there are no "records in evidence to back up any of [the] figures" on State's 
Exhibit 3 (a one-year summary of payments to defendant and his wife), and that those 
figures are only supported by the APA controller's testimony (Def. Br. at 22, 24). 
Two multiple-page exhibits rebut this assertion. 
State's Exhibit 22 consists of copies of APA "Billing & Payment" ledgers for 
June 1992, and copies of checks made out for that month to defendant, his wife, and 
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"GS Consulting." These documents support that defendant was assigning his 
counseling hours to his wife, as reflected on State's Exhibit 3.14 
In addition, Defendant's Exhibit 11 contains copies of APA checks to defendant,. 
his wife, and "GS Consulting" from January 1990 until August 1992. These 
documents support the figures in State's Exhibit 3 representing payments to defendant 
and his wife (see the analysis under (c.) that follows).15 
(c.) "No documentation to support tax withholding". Finally, defendant asserts 
that there is "absolutely no documentation to support" the proposition that differences 
between the figures in State's Exhibit 3 and the amounts of the checks in Defendant's 
Exhibit 11 are attributable to tax withholding (Def. Br. at 25-26). On the contrary, 
State's Exhibits 15 and Defendant's Exhibit 25 both support that the differences were 
for this reason (see also R. 963, 1027). 
State's Exhibit 15 (defendant's W-2 for 1991) shows that a total of $1,063.20 
was withheld from defendant's $4,800.00 salary, leaving an after-withholding balance 
of $3,736.80. Not coincidentally, that is the precise total amount of APA checks made 
payable to defendant in 1991, i.e., $3,736.80 (see Defendant's Exhibit 11, check 
14
 Seen. 11, above. 
15
 It should also be noted that, during his testimony, the APA controller had 
with him and identified the documents he relied on in preparing State's Exhibit 3; 
defendant's trial counsel had these same documents during testimony about the exhibit 
(R. 889-891). 
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numbers 2806, 2865, 2934, 3045, 3096, 3180, 3291 [all for $354.90], 3357, 3401, 
3520, and 3569 [all for $224.40]).l6 State's Exhibit 12 therefore supports that tax 
withholding accounts for the difference between the amounts under "Bob's Salary" in 
State's Exhibit 3, and the amounts on checks payable to defendant during the same 
period in Defendant's Exhibit 11. 
Defendant's Exhibit 25 (the 1991 tax return filed jointly by defendant and his 
wife) also supports that the APA checks payable to "Gale Stringhamw in 1991 reflected 
tax withholding (see Defendant's Exhibit 11). In block 7 of their return, the income 
from wages and tips for 1991 is listed as $9,300.00 (Defendant's Exhibit 25). 
Subtracting defendant's $4,800.00 W-2 salary from this amount leaves a balance of 
$4,500.00 in W-2 salary income which can be attributable to defendant's wife. 
Dividing that amount by 12 yields a monthly pre-withholding W-2 salary of $375.00.l7 
16
 Although checks for January 1991 are missing from the defendant's exhibit, 
the APA controller testified that defendant was paid a direct salary of $400.00 (before 
taxes) that month (R. 882). Assuming defendant's withholding was the same as it was 
for the previous 5 months (see Defendant's Exhibit 11, check numbers 2658, 2570, 
2497, 2460, and 2370 [all for $354.90]) and the following 7 months (see Defendant's 
Exhibit 11, check numbers 2806, 2865, 2934, 3045, 3096, 3180, 3291 [all for 
$354.90]), a jury could reasonably infer that defendant received a check, after 
withholding, of $354.90 in January 1991. 
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 This same amount can be arrived at in a different way. APA paid defendant's 
wife for most of her clinical services through ttGS Consulting'' (R. 904, 963). But so 
that APA could carry her on its malpractice policy for a minimal annual premium, she 
was paid separately for some of her hours in checks payable in her own name (R. 904, 
963, 1219-1220). Based on the face amounts of these checks during 1991 (see 
Defendant's Exhibit 11, check numbers 2810, 2869, 2938, 3049, 3100, 3184, and 3295 
25 
The discrepancies defendant claims exist between State's Exhibit 3 and the 
checks in Defendant's Exhibit 11 (Def. Br. at 25-30) vanish when this pre-withholding 
W-2 salary amount ($375.00) and defendant's pre-withholding W-2 salary amount 
($400.00) are taken into account.18 
[all for $319.13], 3360, 3405, 3524, and 3573 [all for $210.38]), and her hourly rate of 
$25.00 an hour (R. 1219-1220), a jury could reasonably infer that tax was withheld 
(see R. 1027). Given the figures in State's Exhibit 3 and Defendant's Exhibits 11 and 
25, and allowing for tax withholding, a jury could reasonably infer that these monthly 
checks paid defendant's wife for 15 hours (at $25.00 an hour), and that the pre-
withholding amount of her monthly W-2 salary check from APA was $375.00. 
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 For example, for August 1991, adding defendant's pre-withholding W-2 
salary of $400.00 to his wife's pre-withholding W-2 salary of $375.00 and to that 
month's "GS Consulting" payment of $2,800.00 (Defendant's Exhibit 11, check 
number 3369), yields a total of $3,575.00, which is the total listed under "Actual 
Payment" for that month on State's Exhibit 3. Further, taking into account the $375.00 
pre-withholding payment to defendant's wife helps explain the amount of the "GS 
Consulting" payment for August 1991 (Defendant's Exhibit 11, check number 3369). 
The payment to "GS Consulting" can be broken down as follows: it includes 
defendant's $700.00 bookkeeping salary (under "Bob's Fin. Salary," State's Exhibit 3; 
see R. 885-888, 892, 1048-1049, 1070, 1100-1101), the $400.00 for his counseling 
hours that defendant improperly assigned to his wife (under "Assigned Hr. Payment," 
State's Exhibit 3; see R. 890-896, 1232-1233), the $1,987.50 for Gale's undisputed 
hours (under "Gale's Payment", State's Exhibit 3; see R. 893), and the $87.50 
improper "padded payment" (under "Unaccounted," State's Exhibit 3; R. 894). Added 
together, these figures total $3,175.00. When the $375.00 paid to Gale separately (see 
Defendant's Exhibit 11, check number 3360; R. 893, 963) is subtracted, it leaves a 
total of $2,800.00. APA's check to "GS Consulting" for August 1991 was for 
precisely that amount (Defendant's Exhibit 11, check number 3369). 
The same kind of computation works for each of the other months listed on 
State's Exhibit 3: adding the pre-withholding W-2 salaries of defendant and his wife (a 
total of $775.00) to the amount paid by check to "GS Consulting" (see Defendant's 
Exhibit 11) yields the amount of the "Actual Payment" listed on State's Exhibit 3. 
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In summary, State's Exhibit 15 and Defendant's Exhibit 25 support that tax 
withholding accounts for differences between amounts in State's Exhibit 3 and 
Defendant's Exhibit 11. Like his factual assertion to the contrary, defendant's 
conclusory assertion that there are inexplicable discrepancies between the exhibits is 
erroneous. Together with exclusion of his own admissions, defendant's 
misrepresentations about documentation in support of the jury's verdict establishes that 
he has failed to meet his marshaling burden. Since he has failed to meet his burden, 
this Court should decline to consider his insufficiency claim. Farrow. 919 P.2d at 53 
n.l. 
3. Marshaling v. rearguing favorable evidence. In West Valley City v. Majestic 
Inv. Co.. 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App. 1991), this Court wrote: 
In order to properly discharge the duty of marshaling the evidence, the 
challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every 
scrap o? c ^ mpetent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very 
findings Lie appellant resists. 
(Emphasis in original). Instead of marshaling the evidence in support of the jury's 
verdict, defendant "merely reargues the evidence most favorable to him, leaving it to 
this court to sort out what evidence actually supports the jury's verdict." York. 875 
P.2d at 598; see Def. Br. at 7-37. "Although [defendant] cites some evidence that 
supports the court's findings, even a cursory review of the record reveals [defendant] 
frequently omits crucial and mcriminating evidence and cites testimony . . . without 
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reference to conflicting testimony . . . ." Sfifi Alms Indus. Ltd.. 846 P.2d at 1287. 
In summary, because defendant excluded his admissions, misrepresented the 
status of documentation in support of the jury's verdict, and simply reargued favorable 
evidence instead of marshaling the evidence in support of the jury's verdict, this Court 
should decline to consider his insufficiency claim. Farrow. 919 P.2d at 53 n.l. 
B. Sufficient Evidence. Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to 
establish his guilt for communications fraud since it failed to establish that he had a 
scheme or artifice to defraud, and that he made representations or omissions 
intentionally or knowingly (Def. Br. at 32-33). Defendant further argues that his 
"honest belief that what he was doing was proper" should have served as a complete 
defense (Def. Br. at 34). 
In addition, defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish his 
guilt for theft since it fails to establish that he had the intent to steal (Def. Br. at 21). 
Defendant further asserts that "much of the evidence presented supported the 
proposition that [he] honestly believed he was paying himself and GS Consulting the 
proper amount due to them" (I$L). 
Assuming, arguendo, this Court decides consider the merits of defendant's 
insufficiency claim, he has failed to establish that, viewed in the light most favorable to 
the jury's verdict, the evidence and all reasonably inferences which may be drawn from 
it are so sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must 
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have entertained a reasonable doubt as to defendant's guilt. Sfig Hamilton. 827 P.2d at 
235. 
1. August 12. 1991 agreement. The terms of defendant's August 12, 1991 
agreement with APA are critical to his arguments about counts HI through XVI (two of 
the communications fraud counts, and the twelve theft counts). Defendant essentially 
asks this Court to rely on his wife's testimony about the terms of this agreement to the 
exclusion of the other testimony at his trial. In other words, defendant is asking this 
Court to reject the jury's conclusions about witness credibility. The Utah Supreme 
Court has written: 
When the evidence presented is conflicting or disputed, the jury serves as 
the exclusive judge of both the credibility of witnesses and the weight to 
be given particular evidence. State v. Myers. 606 P.2d 250, 253 (Utah 
1980); State v. Gentry. 747 P.2d 1032, 1039 (Utah 1987); State v. 
Logan, 563 P.2d 811, 813 (Utah 1977); State v. Harless. 23 Utah 2d 128, 
459 P.2d 210, 211 (Utah 1969). Ordinarily, a reviewing court may not 
reassess credibility or reweigh the evidence, but must resolve conflicts in 
the evidence in favor of the jury verdict. Logan, 563 P.2d at 813-14. 
State v. Workman. 852 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993). The supreme court concluded that 
in "some unusual circumstances" a reviewing court may reassess witness credibility, 
such as where there is "either a physical impossibility of the evidence being true, or its 
falsity must be apparent, without any resort to inferences or deductions." LL (citing 
Curtis v. DeAtlev. 663 P.2d 1089, 1092 (Idaho 1983) (quoting Dinneen v. Finch. 100 
Idaho 620, 603 P.2d 575, 582 (Idaho 1979)); see also Siruta v. Hesston Corp.. 232 
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Kan. 654, 659 P.2d 799, 806 (Kan. 1983) (evidence may be disregarded when it is 
"clearly contrary to some immutable law of physics or is hopelessly in conflict with one 
or more established and uncontroverted physical facts")). Since such unusual 
circumstances do not exist in this case, the jury's credibility determinations should not 
be disturbed. 
Aside from the self-serving testimony of defendant's wife, testimony about the 
terms of defendant's August 12, 1991 agreement with APA is consistent and 
corroborated even by defendant's own admissions. Those terms were simply that APA 
would continue to pay defendant $400.00 a month for administrative duties and 
counseling, and begin paying defendant $700.00 a month for bookkeeping and financial 
duties, and that APA would no longer pay draws on future revenues to defendant (R. 
885-888, 973, 1048-1049). 
Defendant's wife's contrary testimony was weak. She did not attend the meeting 
in which the agreement was reached, and could not even remember who told her the 
purported terms of the agreement (R. 1233). Furthermore, her testimony that it was 
not agreed that defendant would be paid a flat salary of $1,100.00 a month (R. 1233) 
contradicts the other witnesses to the agreement (R. 885-888, 973, 1048-1049) and 
defendant's own 1991 admission that APA was, in fact, paying him $1,100.00 a month 
(R. 1070). Likewise, her testimony about payments to "GS Consulting" for continued 
draws on future revenues and $1,000.00 a month for bookkeeping (R. 1220, 1223) is 
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contradicted, not only by the other witnesses to the agreement (R. 885-888, 973, 1048-
1049), but by defendant's admission that he, not *GS Consulting," was eventually 
making about $2,000.00 a month from APA (R. 1100-1101). Finally, defendant's 
admission that APA was paying him $700.00 a month, in addition to his $400.00 
salary, corroborates the testimony that APA paid him $700.00 a month for bookkeeping 
(R. 885-888, 973, 1048-1049), as it contradicts his wife's testimony that APA paid 
"GS Consulting" $1,100.00 a month for bookkeeping. By their verdict, it is clear the 
jury rejected the testimony of defendant's wife about his agreement. This credibility 
determination should not be disturbed on appeal. Sfi£ Workman. 852 P.2d at 984. 
In summary, defendant's reliance on his wife's testimony to establish the 
purported terms of his employment agreement is misplaced since her testimony was 
obviously disbelieved by the jury, and reviewing courts are required to defer to a jury's 
credibility determinations. Defendant's reliance is, in any event, misplaced since she 
was not a party to the agreement and could not remember who told her of its purported 
terms, and since her testimony is contradicted by other testimony and defendant's 
omitted admissions. 
2. Communications fraud. 
a. Scheme or artifice to defraud. Defendant argues that the evidence at trial is 
insufficient to establish that defendant had "a scheme or artifice to defraud" (Def. Br. 
at 33). Utah Code Ann. §76-10-1801(1) (1990) states: 
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(1) Any person who has devised any scheme or artifice to defraud 
another or to obtain from another money, property, or anything of value 
by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or 
material omissions, and who communicates directly or indirectly with any 
person by any means for the purpose of executing or concealing the 
scheme or artifice is guilty of [communications fraud]. . . . 
The evidence establishes that "GS Consulting," the name on the joint checking account 
defendant opened with his wife, was part of the "scheme or artifice" defendant devised 
and used to defraud the pension fund, and that the annual report of income he signed, 
and his attached W-2 form, were the means he used to communicate the 
misrepresentation that concealed his actual income (State's Exhibits 13-15). 
As noted, defendant asked APA to pay compensation in addition to his $400.00 
monthly salary to "GS Consulting" (R. 877-879, 882, 883-888, 985-988, 1048-1049). 
Defendant admitted as much (R. 1070), and his wife's testimony corroborated his 
admission (R. 1232-1233). Since these payments were not reported on his W-2 or by 
defendant himself as "other earned income" in the space provided on his annual 
reports, a jury could reasonably infer that defendant's surreptitious diversion of income 
to "GS Consulting" was the scheme or artifice defendant used to hide his actual income 
from the pension fund. 
b. Knowing and intentional omissions. Defendant argues that the evidence was 
insufficient to establish that he made "any representations or omissions intentionally or 
knowingly" (Def. Br. at 17). Utah Code Ann. §76-10-1801(7) (1990) states: 
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(7) A person may not be convicted under this section unless the 
pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions made or 
omitted were made or omitted intentionally, knowingly, or with a reckless 
disregard for the truth. 
Defendant's admissions about his income from APA establish that his representations 
and omissions in his reports to the pension fund were both knowing and intentional. 
In 1991 defendant told a prospective APA employee that he made $400.00 a 
month, but "needed $1,100" and that he had the additional $700.00 put into "GS 
Consulting" (R. 1070). From this admission, a jury could reasonably infer that 
defendant knowingly received more than $400.00 a month, that he intentionally had 
extra income paid into aGS Consulting," and that his omission of income in his 1991 
report to the pension fund was knowingly false. 
In an October 1993 taped interview with a sheriffs office investigator, defendant 
initially stated that he had a $400.00 salary from APA, but he later indicated that, as 
his responsibilities increased, so did his income, and that he was eventually bringing in 
about $2,000.00 a month from APA (R. 1100-1101). Yet he reported to the pension 
fund that he was receiving only $400.00 a month. Based on this evidence, a jury could 
reasonably infer that defendant knowingly and intentionally under-reported his income 
to the pension fund. 
c. No honest belief. In short, defendant's admissions establish that his failure to 
disclose these substantial amounts to his pension fund was knowing and intentional and 
33 
that he could not and did not have an "honest belief" that the amounts he reported were 
correct. Defendant has failed to establish that, viewed in the light most favorable to the 
jury's verdict, the evidence and reasonable inferences are so sufficiently inconclusive or 
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt 
that defendant's guilt. Sfifi Hamilton, 827 P.2d at 235. 
3. Theft 
a. Intent to steal. Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to show 
he had the intent to steal from APA (Def. Br. at 21). Defendant asserts that because 
there was "mass confusion" (Def. Br. at 22, 31) as to his agreement with the company, 
he "held an honest belief that he was writing checks to himself, his wife and GS 
Consulting in the amounts agreed upon" (Def. Br. at 31). Defendant cites his wife's 
second-hand and discredited testimony about the agreement as evidence of the "mass 
confusion" and his "honest belief." 
As noted (see L., above), the credible testimony established that on August 12, 
1991, APA agreed to continue to pay defendant $400.00 a month for administrative 
duties and counseling, and to begin paying defendant $700.00 a month for bookkeeping 
and financial duties. APA and defendant also agreed on that date that APA would no 
longer pay draws on future revenues to defendant (R. 885-888, 973, 1048-1049). 
Following this agreement, defendant manifested his intent to steal because the amounts 
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he made payable to ttGS Consulting" exceeded the amounts authorized under the terms 
of this agreement. 
(VS Double charging. Immediately after he was put in control of payroll, 
defendant manifested his intent to steal by assigning counseling hours he had worked to 
his wife in violation of his agreement with APA. Payments for the assigned hours 
while defendant was in control of payroll totaled $2,525.00 (R. 892-905; State's 
Exhibit 3). 
APA never agreed to pay defendant by the hour for counseling services he 
provided, and never authorized defendant to assign his hours for payroll purposes (R. 
876-877, 942-943, 1048-1049, 1218-1220). Defendant agreed that his $400.00 salary 
was to cover any counseling he provided (R. 876-878, 885-888). Defendant's wife 
nevertheless conceded on cross-examination that APA did pay "GS Consulting" for 
hours of clinical counseling defendant provided (R. 1233).19 
Documentary evidence corroborates this concession. Payroll ledgers show 
19
 Defendant's wife testified that mere were discrepancies between the number 
of hours her records showed she had worked and what APA's payment and billing 
ledgers reflected for the period between August 1991 and August 1992 (R. 1222-1228; 
Defendant's Exhibit 27). She also testified that APA actually owed her more money 
(R. 1221-1222). This claim is a remarkable "red herring" since she testified that she 
and defendant did APA's bookkeeping together during this period (R. 1220), the parties 
stipulated that defendant wrote the bulk of all APA checks during this period (R. 1022), 
and there was no dispute about past payments for her hours when, following their 
resignations, defendant submitted aGS Consulting's" final accounting to APA (R. 
1221-1222; Defendant's Exhibit 20). 
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defendant's name crossed out as the therapist and his wife's name written in (see., £,&., 
State's Exhibit 22, Billing & Payment Ledger entries dated 6/9/92, 6/15/92, 6/23/92, 
and 6/30/92; SSSL R. 910-913, 938-941). The parties stipulated that these changes were 
in defendant's handwriting (R. 1231). As a result of these changes, defendant was paid 
twice for his services: once by his regular salary, and again by attributing his work to 
his wife and billing APA at her hourly rate (R. 885-888, 973, 1048-1049). Such a 
double payment was not authorized by defendant's agreement with APA (R. 942-943; 
1048-1049). 
Because defendant assigned his counseling hours to his wife so that he could be 
paid twice, in violation of his agreement with APA, a jury could reasonably infer that 
defendant had the intent to steal. Defendant has failed to establish that, viewed in the 
light most favorable to the jury's verdict, the evidence and reasonable inferences are so 
inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that he had the intent to steal. Hamilton. 827 P.2d at 235. 
(2) Padded payments. With control over payroll, defendant immediately began 
making monthly padded payments to "GS Consulting." Since these payments were in 
addition even to the hours defendant assigned to his wife and are not supported by any 
agreement between the parties, they likewise manifest defendant's intent to steal. 
After accounting for defendant's $700.00 "bookkeeping'' salary, payment for the 
counseling hours he was improperly assigning to his wife, and payment for his wife's 
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undisputed hours, the unaccountable padded payments for the 12 months defendant was 
in control of payroll totaled $12,387.50 (R. 892-905; State's Exhibit 3). 
Defendant's wife's testimony suggested that these amounts could be explained by 
discrepancies in the payments for her hours, draws on future revenue, or profit-sharing. 
It is clear by their verdict that the jury rejected these explanations and found that the 
testimony of defendant's wife was not credible. This credibility determination should 
not be disturbed on appeal. Sfifi Workman. 852 P.2d at 984. 
As described in n.19 above, discrepancies in his wife's hours are a "red herring" 
since defendant himself was in charge of bookkeeping and payroll during this period, 
and made out the payroll checks. Indeed, defendant's wife does not account for the 
padded payments by claiming that APA mistakenly overpaid her — she has insinuated 
instead that APA somehow underpaid her (R. 1221-1228). 
Neither can draws on future revenues explain the unaccountable amounts. 
Defendant's wife was alone in testifying that a $600.00 draw on future revenues 
continued through this period (R. 1220, 1223). However, the credible evidence is that 
all draws on future revenues ceased as of August 1991 (R. 885-888, 973, 1048-1049). 
Further, testimony that the draws had increased to $800.00 and then $900.00 before 
they ceased in August is supported by the checks themselves (R. 877-878; see. R. 1220; 
Defendant's Exhibit 11, check numbers 2122, 2172, 2180, 4046, 2268, 2301, 2474, 
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2501, 2582, 2670). In any event, none of the unaccountable amounts after August 
equals $600.00 (State's Exhibit 3). In fact, all but the first actually exceed it. LL 
Finally, profit-sharing cannot explain the unaccountable amounts. Defendant's 
wife was also alone in testifying that APA and ttGS Consulting" had a profit-sharing 
agreement during this period (R. 1219; but see R. 1192). However, based on her 
testimony and tax returns, "GS Consulting" had no profit (R. 1234; Defendant's 
Exhibits 24-26). But even if it had, this could not account for the defendant's padded 
payments since his final accounting to APA, dated September 1, 1992, claims that a 
share of profits due to "GS Consulting" from January 1, 1991 until August 31, 1992 
had not yet been paid (Defendant's Exhibit 20). 
In summary, because the padded payment amounts cannot be attributed to his 
wife's hours, draws on future revenue, or profit-sharing, a jury could reasonably infer 
that defendant had the intent to steal. Defendant has failed to establish that, viewed in 
the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, the evidence and reasonable inferences 
are so sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must 
have entertained a reasonable doubt as to defendant's guilt. Sfifi Hamilton. 827 P.2d at 
235. 
h. No honest belief. Because defendant chose not to testify, there was no direct 
evidence before the jury that defendant believed his acts were innocent. Moreover, 
because his wife did not testify as to terms defendant told her he believed were part of 
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his agreement, there is not even second-hand evidence as to his belief. Nevertheless, 
the trial court gave the "honest belief' defense instruction to the jury (R. 319, 
Instruction No. 25). By its verdict, the jury demonstrated that it rejected this defense. 
Based on the evidence before it, the jury acted reasonably. Defendant has failed to 
establish that, viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, the evidence is so 
inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt as to defendant's guilt. Sfifi Hamilton. 827 P.2d at 235. 
Point 2 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN 
IT PERMITTED THE TESTIMONY OF AN INTERNAL REVENUE 
SERVICE AGENT THAT ASSIGNING INCOME IS UNLAWFUL; 
IN ANY EVENT, ANY ERROR IN ADMISSION OF THIS 
TESTIMONY WAS HARMLESS 
Defendant argues that it was an abuse of discretion to permit an IRS agent, who 
was qualified as an expert, to testify that assigning income is unlawful, because the 
testmony went directly to the expert's opinion as to defendant's guilt, and because the 
testimony was irrelevant (Def. Br. at 37-41). These assertions are not only 
inconsistent, but both are erroneous. The expert's testimony was not a comment on 
defendant's guilt, but it was relevant on the issue of defendant's intent. Even 
assuming, arguendo, that it was improper to admit this testimony, any error was 
harmless. 
The challenged testimony follows: 
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Q I'm going to pose a hypothetical. If an individual - we'll call him 
Mr. A [-] performs personal services, such as accounting work, tax 
preparation, payroll preparation, filing of quarterly tax returns, 
preparation of tax documents for employers, a compilation of payroll 
records, and clinical works [sic] such as counseling, group therapyf,] 
individual counseling, is it lawful for that individual to assign income 
from those activities to a third party[?]. 
• • • 
A No, that is not lawful. 
(R. 1066). 
A. Not a comment on guilt. On its face, this testimony cannot be construed as 
expressing an opinion about defendant's guilt as to the charged offenses. Whether 
assigning income is unlawful was not even an issue to be decided by the jury in 
defendant's case (see R. 335, 332, 331, 337-338). As trial defense counsel pointed out 
in challenging the testimony, "We are not here over a tax law" (R. 1057). The charged 
offenses were violations of Utah communications fraud, theft, and racketeering statutes 
(see Utah Code Ann. §76-10-1801(1990), §76-6-404 and 412 (1989), and §76-6-1602 
(1994)). The IRS agent's testimony related specifically to federal tax law, and he cited 
a federal statute as the basis for his opinion ("26 U.S.C."- R. 1068).20 
This Court has written, "'it [is] clear that questions which would merely allow 
the witness to tell the jury what result to reach are not permitted. Nor is the rule [Rule 
704] intended to allow a witness to give legal conclusions.'" State v. Tenney. 913 P.2d 
20
 Although federal tax law was implicated because defendant was required to 
file his W-2 in support of his annual report of actual income to the pension fund (see 
State's Exhibits 13-15), defendant was not being prosecuted for federal tax fraud. 
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750, 756 (Utah App.) (quoting Davidson v. Prince. 813 P.2d 1225, 1231 (Utah App.) 
(quoting Owen v. Kerr-McGee Corp.. 698 F.2d 236, 240 (5th Cir. 1983)), cert.denied. 
826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991)), cert.denied. 923 P.2d 693 (Utah 1996); accoid State v. 
LaiSfin, 828 P.2d 487, 493 (Utah App.), afCd, 865 P.2d 1355 (Utah 1993). Quoting 
Davidson, however, the Court in Tenney noted that "'there is no bright line between 
permissible questions under Rule 704 and those that call for overbroad legal 
responses. '" I$L The Court specifically concluded that the expert testimony in question 
in Tenney provided "an impermissible legal conclusion" because it was tied to the 
requirements of Utah law. LL 
In defendant's case, the expert's opinion related to federal tax law, not Utah law 
(R. 1068). Defendant's case is similar to State v. Harry. 873 P.2d 1149 (Utah App. 
1994). In that case, Harry objected to the expert's testimony that a certain securities 
transaction was "illegal." Id,, at 1154 n.9. Harry complained that this testimony was 
inadmissible "because it expressed a legal conclusion on a point that was not even an 
element of me crime" of which he was charged, and that "the information prejudiced 
the jury against him." LL In rejecting Harry's argument, this Court concluded that 
the expert never testified that Harry actually [engaged in the illegal 
transaction]. That factual determination was left to the jury. Moreover, 
the fact that [the questioned transaction] is prohibited is relevant to 
Harry's state of mind and the willfulness of his actions. We therefore see 
no error on the part of the trial court on this point. 
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Id. Thus, as opposed to the expert in lejmsy., the expert witness in Hany did not 
express an impermissible legal conclusion. 
This conclusion in Harry should be dispositive in defendant's case. Although, as 
a practical matter, to convict defendant, the jury had to make the factual finding that he 
assigned his income to deceive the pension fund as to his actual income, the jury was 
not required to find that assigning income was unlawful (see R. 335, Instruction No. 
10). Indeed, they could have concluded that assigning income was not unlawful and 
still found defendant guilty. IsL Further, the IRS agent did not testify on the factual 
issue as to whether, in his opinion, defendant had actually assigned his income. He 
testified based on a hypothetical. See Utah R. Evid. 703, 704(a). The jury was still 
required to make its own factual determinations. Sss. Harry. 873 P.2d at 1154 n.9. 
The agent's testimony did not "simply tell the jury what [factual or legal] result to 
reach." Davidson v. Prince. 813 P.2d 1225, 1231 (Utah App. 1991). Therefore, 
because it did not relate directly to a conclusion to be made by the jury, the IRS agent's 
opinion about the lawfulness of assigning income could not be construed either as an 
impermissible legal opinion or as an opinion as to defendant's guilt.21 
21
 Defendant has made no suggestion that the IRS agent's testimony was unfairly 
prejudicial because its probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice or confusion of the issues. See Utah R. Evid. 103(a)(1) and 403. 
Since he failed to assert a claim of prejudice at the trial court (R. 1055-1068), this issue 
is not properly preserved for appeal. State v. Larsen. 865 P.2d 1355, 1363 n.12 (Utah 
1993). 
42 
B. Relevant on intent. After mistakenly complaining that the testimony 
commented on defendant's guilt, defendant makes the inconsistent claim that the agent's 
testimony should have been excluded as irrelevant (Def. Br. at 39-41). "Relevant 
evidence" means "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that 
is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than 
it would be without the evidence." Utah R. Evid. 401. 
Here, defendant created an elaborate scheme to disguise the nature of his income 
and even to obtain and conceal income he had never earned. His defense was that he 
had acted in the honest belief that the scheme was innocent (see Def. Br. at 19-40). 
Hence, evidence that assigning income (one element of defendant's scheme) was 
unlawful had a tendency to make his intent to commit the charged crimes more 
probable, and his "honest belief" defense less probable (see R. 318, Instruction No. 
26). Indeed, defendant argues that his "defense . . . was not contradicted by any other 
witness than" the agent (Def. Br. at 39). Therefore, the agent's testimony was 
relevant. Sfi£ alSQ Harry. 873 P.2d at 1154 n.9 (expert testimony that a questioned 
transaction is illegal was relevant to the defendant's state of mind and the willfulness of 
his actions). 
C. Harmless error. Even if the IRS agent's testimony were improperly 
admitted, defendant has failed to provide any legal analysis or precedent regarding his 
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claim of prejudice. Indeed, the agent's testimony cannot have been prejudicial since 
defendant's own witness testified to the same effect. 
Defendant makes only two assertions regarding prejudice. He argues that, since 
his defense was only contradicted by the agent's testimony, "it is clear the testimony 
had a prejudicial affect [sic] on the outcome of this matter" (Def. Br. at 39). He also 
asserts, "Allowing [the agent] to testify as an expert witness in this matter was clear 
error and resulted in extreme prejudice to the defendant and an unfair trial''(Def. Br. at 
40-41). Aside from these brief, conclusory statements, defendant has completely failed 
to provide any legal analysis or precedent regarding his claim of prejudice. Sfi£ 
Tenney. 913 P.2d at 756 (even where error obvious, no prejudice where defendant 
failed to demonstrate prejudice). For this reason alone, his claim fails. LL 
In addition, Mr. Ronald Harrington, defendant's own CPA, testified without 
objection that assigning income was improper: 
Q. . . . If [defendant] had a contract to perform services for a third 
party, APA, to do bookkeeping, payroll, file quarterlies, do the tax work, 
maintain the books, administer the offices, do counseling, and he received 
$1,100 for that, would he be eligible to put any portion of his $1,100 into 
Gale Stringham's name? 
A. No 
Q. Then he could not assign his income to her 1099? 
A. No. . . . 
Q. Using that exact same analogy, if someone agreed to pay you $1,100 
a month to do books, to do that sort of thing, could you then show it as 
income to your wife? 
A. No, and not be correct. 
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Q. And if your wife had a sole proprietorship, if she was also doing 
business, if she had also taken that name, used that name as well, would it 
be proper for you to pay that money to her sole proprietorship as income? 
A. Money that I earned myself? 
Q. That you earned. 
A. No. 
(R. 1210-1212). Indeed, Mr. Harrington actually testified that assigning income 
would be "tax fraud'' if intent to defraud were shown (R. 1212). 
Further, although defense counsel claimed that defendant had acted in reliance 
on Mr. Harrington's advice (R. 1108; sfi£ R. 318, Instruction No. 26), Mr. Harrington 
testified that defendant had not asked for his advice on the subject until nearly nine 
months after the date of defendant's last charged offense (R. 1211). This testimony, 
elicited during presentation of defendant's case, made any error in admitting the IRS 
agent's testimony harmless. 
Finally, defendant's assignment of his APA income was not authorized by APA 
(R. 876-877, 885-888, 942-943, 1048-1049, 1218-1220). However, defendant's wife 
nevertheless conceded on cross-examination that APA did pay "GS Consulting" for 
work defendant performed (R. 1232-1233). This evidence that, contrary to his 
agreement with APA, defendant actually did assign his income to "GS Consulting" 
made any error in admitting the IRS agent's opinion in response to a hypothetical 
question harmless. Sfi£ State v. Larsen. 865 P.2d 1355, 1363 (Utah 1993) (trial court's 
proper instructions made any error in admitting expert testimony harmless). 
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Point 3 
THE TRIAL COURT DID INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE 
CRIMINAL INTENT REQUIRED FOR COMMUNICATIONS 
FRAUD, AND THE INSTRUCTIONS WERE SUFFICIENT 
Defendant argues that the trial court completely failed to instruct the jury on the 
mens rea required to convict defendant of communications fraud (Def. Br. at 41-45). 
Defendant's claim is erroneous (see R. 335, Instruction No. 10; see also instructions on 
intent, R. 321-326, Instruction Nos. 18-23; the "honest belief defense, R. 319, 
Instruction No. 25; and the "mistake of fact" defense, R. 318, Instruction No. 26). 
Indeed, the trial court's instructions on mens rea included the four instructions on intent 
and knowledge proposed by defendant (R. 273, 274, 275, 286; contra Def. Br. at 43). 
Defendant's argument is therefore without merit. 
This court reviews the trial court's jury instructions on elements of a crime 
under a correctness standard. State v. Gibson. 908 P.2d 352, 354 (Utah App.) (citing 
State v. Stevenson. 884 P.2d 1287, 1290 (Utah App. 1994), cert.denied. 892 P.2d 13 
(Utah 1995)), cert.denied. 917 P.2d 556 (Utah 1996). However, jury instructions to 
which a party failed to object at trial will not be reviewed absent a showing of manifest 
injustice. LL (citing Utah R.Crim.P. 19(c); State v. Perdue. 813 P.2d 1201, 1203 
(Utah App. 1991) aJId, 900 P.2d 1093 (Utah 1995)). Failure to give an elements 
instruction for a crime satisfies the manifest injustice standard under Rule 19(c) and 
constitutes reversible error as a matter of law. I$L (citing State v. Jones. 823 P.2d 
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1059, 1061 (Utah 1991)). However, since the trial court instructed the jury on the 
mens rea element, defendant's failure to object to the instructions has waived this issue. 
See Stevenson. 884 P.2d at 1290. 
The trial court's instructions on intent and knowledge were sufficient in any 
event. In State v. Tebbs. 786 P.2d 775 (Utah App. 1990), this Court made clear that 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of either knowledge of the falsity of the 
communication, or a reckless disregard for the truth is required for a conviction under 
the communications fraud statute. Sfie. Utah Code Ann. §76-10-1801(7) (1990) 
(amended in 1990 to include alternative of "intentionally"). 
The pertinent paragraphs of Instruction No. 10, given by the trial court, follow: 
The essential elements of the crime of Communications Fraud . . . 
are as follows: 
1. That the defendant. . . 
4. Having devised a scheme or artifice to defrand [sic] another or 
to obtain from another amoney [sic], proeprty [sic], or anything of 
value, [sic] 
5. By means of false or fraudulent pretense, representations, 
promises or material omissions, 
6. Did communicate directly or indirectly with another by any 
means for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme or artifice. 
(R. 335; addendum E). This language essentially mirrors the statutory language 
defining the offense. Sfi£ Utah Code Ann. §76-10-1801(1) (1990); see also. Utah Code 
Ann. §76-2-102 (1983). 
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This instruction requires that, to convict, the jury must find that defendant 
"devised a scheme or artifice to defraud" and communicated false information "for the 
purpose o r executing that scheme or artifice. On its face, this instruction satisfies the 
requirement that defendant intentionally communicate false information, or have 
knowledge of the falsity of the communication. 
As this Court has noted, jury instructions are reviewed "in their entirety to 
determine whether the instructions, taken as a whole, fairly instruct the jury on uie 
applicable law." Law v. Blanding City. 893 P.2d 1083 (Utah App.), cert.denied. 910 
P.2d 425 (Utah 1995). A conviction will be reversed on an instructional issue "only 
where the party challenging the propriety of the instruction 'demonstrates prejudice 
stemming from the instructions viewed in the aggregate.'" LL (quoting State v. Haston. 
811 P.2d 929, 931 (Utah App. 1991), rev'd on other grounds. 846 P.2d 1276 (Utah 
1993)). Taken in the aggregate, the communications fraud instruction and the other 
instructions, given at defendant's trial without objection, were sufficient to instruct the 
jury as to the mens rea required for a communications fraud conviction (see instructions 
on: intent, R. 321-326, Instruction Nos. 18-23; the "honest belief" defense, R. 319, 
Instruction No. 25; and the "mistake of fact" defense, R. 318, Instruction No. 26). 
For example, the trial court gave the following instructions, proposed by 
defendant: 
48 
A person engages in conduct knowingly with respect to the conduct 
or to circumstances surrounding the conduct when that person is aware of 
the nature of the conduct or the existing circumstances. A person acts 
knowingly with respect to a result of the conduct when that person is 
aware that the conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. 
A person engages in conduct intentionally when it is that person's 
conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result. 
. . . In every crime or public offense there must exist a union or joint 
operation of act and intent. . . . You are instructed that: 
(1) Unless otherwise provided, ignorance or mistake of fact which 
disproves the culpable mental state is a defense to any prosecution for that 
crime. . . . 
(R. 321-22, 318; Instructions 22-23, 26). Therefore, in the context of the other jury 
instructions, the trial court's mens rea instruction (that defendant, who had "devised a 
scheme to defraud,'' must have communicated with another "for the purpose of" 
executing his scheme to defraud) was sufficient. 
Point 4 
TRIAL DEFENSE COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THE 
TRIAL COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS DID NOT CONSTITUTE 
DEFICIENT PERFORMANCE WHICH PREJUDICED 
DEFENDANT BECAUSE THE INSTRUCTIONS WERE PROPER 
Defendant argues that, if the instruction issue under Point 3 was not preserved, 
it was deficient performance for his trial defense counsel not to raise it (Def. Br. at 45-
46). Defendants argument is moot and can be resolved in the issue of prejudice, since, 
whether or not his counsel had raised it at trial, the issue would have been reviewable 
under "manifest error." In any event, trial defense counsel's failure to object was not 
deficient performance since the trial court's instructions were proper. 
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The Supreme Court noted in Strickland v. Washington. 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2069 
(1984), "If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of 
sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed." 
Accord, State V. Garrett, 849 P.2d 578 (Utah App.), cert.denied. 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 
1993). It is so in this case. Even had defense counsel objected, it is not reasonably 
likely that the outcome would have been different. Cartel, 776 P.2d at 893-94 n.30; 
Strickland. 104 S.Ct. at 2069 (1984). Failure to give an elements instruction for a 
crime satisfies the manifest injustice standard under Rule 19(c) and constitutes 
reversible error as a matter of law, regardless of whether the issue was preserved for 
appeal by an objection at trial. Gibson, 908 P.2d at 354. Had the trial court failed to 
give an elements instruction, trial defense counsel's objection would have been 
superfluous. Since the instruction was given, and the jury instructions were not in 
error, there was no deficient performance and no prejudice. 
CONCLUSION 
The convictions and sentence should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this Q-KA day of May, 1997. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
BARNARD N. MADSEN 
Assistant Attorney General 
50 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellee were mailed 
by first class mail this gRty day of May, 1997 to: 
Wendy M. Lewis 
Attorney for Appellant 
50 West Broadway, Suite 400 




Bob Stringham 1990 Distribution Chart 









$600 I $600 








^ - $13,712.75 
$400 $400 $400 $400 
$912.75 
$400 $400 $400 $400 $400 $400 $400 $400 




Bob Stringham 1991 Distribution Chart 
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Bob Stringham 1992 Distribution Chart 
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Bob & Gail Stringham Distribution Chart 
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Addendum £ 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
The essential elements of the crime of Communication 
Fraud, a Second Degree Felony, as charged Counts 2, 3 and 4 of the 
Information, are as follows: 
1. That the defendant, Robert Stringham, 
2. On or about January 29, 1991, May 6, 1992, and 
February 6, 1993, 
3- In Utah County, Utah, 
4. Having devised a scheme or artifice to defrand 
another or to obtain from another amoney, proeprty, or anything of 
value. 
5. By means of false or fraudulent pretense, 
representations, promises or material omission, 
6. Did communicate directly or indirectly with another 
by any means for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme 
or artifice, 
7. And that the property, money, or thing obtained or 
sought to be obtained has a value of more than $10,000 but does not 
exceed $100,000. 
If the State has failed to prove to your satisfaction 
beyond a reasonable doubt any one or more of the essential elements 
of the crime charged in Counts 2, 3, and 4, you must acquit the 
